Liste des Groupes | Revenir à s logic |
On 3/12/24 1:35 PM, olcott wrote:I don't think that this has anything to do with Turing completeness.On 3/12/2024 3:31 PM, immibis wrote:And your computation system isn't Turing Complete, by definition.On 12/03/24 20:02, olcott wrote:>On 3/12/2024 1:31 PM, immibis wrote:>On 12/03/24 19:12, olcott wrote:>∀ H ∈ Turing_Machine_Deciders>
∃ TMD ∈ Turing_Machine_Descriptions |
Predicted_Behavior(H, TMD) != Actual_Behavior(TMD)
>
There is some input TMD to every H such that
Predicted_Behavior(H, TMD) != Actual_Behavior(TMD)
And it can be a different TMD to each H.
>When we disallow decider/input pairs that are incorrect>
questions where both YES and NO are the wrong answer
Once we understand that either YES or NO is the right answer, the whole rebuttal is tossed out as invalid and incorrect.
>
Ĥ.q0 ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⊢* Ĥ.Hq0 ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⊢* Ĥ.Hqy ∞ // Ĥ applied to ⟨Ĥ⟩ halts
Ĥ.q0 ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⊢* Ĥ.Hq0 ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⊢* Ĥ.Hqn // Ĥ applied to ⟨Ĥ⟩ does not halt
BOTH YES AND NO ARE THE WRONG ANSWER FOR EVERY Ĥ.H ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⟨Ĥ⟩
>
Once we understand that either YES or NO is the right answer, the whole rebuttal is tossed out as invalid and incorrect.
>>>Does the barber that shaves everyone that does not shave>
themselves shave himself? is rejected as an incorrect question.
The barber does not exist.
Russell's paradox did not allow this answer within Naive set theory.
Naive set theory says that for every predicate P, the set {x | P(x)} exists. This axiom was a mistake. This axiom is not in ZFC.
>
In Turing machines, for every non-empty finite set of alphabet symbols Γ, every b∈Γ, every Σ⊆Γ, every non-empty finite set of states Q, every q0∈Q, every F⊆Q, and every δ:(Q∖F)×Γ↛Q×Γ×{L,R}, ⟨Q,Γ,b,Σ,δ,q0,F⟩ is a Turing machine. Do you think this is a mistake? Would you remove this axiom from your version of Turing machines?
>
(Following the definition used on Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turing_machine#Formal_definition)
>>The following is true statement:>
>
∀ Barber ∈ People. ¬(∀ Person ∈ People. Shaves(Barber, Person) ⇔ ¬Shaves(Person, Person))
>
The following is a true statement:
>
¬∃ Barber ∈ People. (∀ Person ∈ People. Shaves(Barber, Person) ⇔ ¬Shaves(Person, Person))
>
That might be correct I did not check it over and over
again and again to make sure.
>
The same reasoning seems to rebut Gödel Incompleteness:
...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
asserts its own unprovability. 15 ... (Gödel 1931:43-44)
¬∃G ∈ F | G := ~(F ⊢ G)
>
Any G in F that asserts its own unprovability in F is
asserting that there is no sequence of inference steps
in F that prove that they themselves do not exist in F.
The barber does not exist and the proposition does not exist.
>
When we do this exact same thing that ZFC did for self-referential
sets then self-referential (thus pathological) inputs to halt deciders
cannot exist.
>
You are saying there are some computations that Turing Machines can do (like H^) that can not exist in your system.--
That option has been rejected as viable for Computation Theory
Les messages affichés proviennent d'usenet.