Re: Can there be a truth without a truthmaker?

On 4/6/2024 11:26 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

On 04/05/2024 09:44 PM, olcott wrote:

On 4/5/2024 8:26 PM, Lawrence D'Oliveiro wrote:

On Thu, 4 Apr 2024 18:57:44 -0500, olcott wrote:
>

There are only two kinds of truth:
(a) Analytic truth where expressions of language are true on the basis
of their meaning. Example: "All dogs are animals."
>
(b) Empirical truth, expressions of language that rely on sense data
from the sense organs. Example: "There is a dog in my living room right
now."

>
Which kind of truth is that statement?

>
Everything that can be encoded using language is analytic.
>

 It seems you're just talking about the usual old logical positivism's
scientific demarcation,

Not at all. Any truth that can be encapsulated in language is construed
as analytic. The actual smell of roses, taste of strawberries, sound of
a dog barking and such like physical sensations are the only things that
are excluded.

and the usual old idea that mathematics is
analytic while experience is empirical, then as with regards to
that you seem to be expressing that truth requires a greater theory,
that demands a theory of truth to be analytic, with regards to then
the usual milieu of science or scientism's expectations that the
epistemological is only empirical, vis-a-vis, that mathematics
and logic for example are analytic, so that there's a perceived
disconnect between the teleology of the analytic and the ontological
of the empirical, so that you need something like Kant's sublime
and Hegel's fuller dialectic, so that the theory is the wider theory,
while at the same time incorporates both the a priori and a posteriori.
 It's sort of like you're noticing that "prediction by falsifiability"
is an oxymoron, and that it's like empirical theory and scientific
truth were both oxymorons, and they made an oxymoron baby, and
that logical positivism that isn't a stronger logical positivism
and also a stronger mathematical platonism, was a bigger oxymoron.
 

It is possible that everything that appears to be a physical sensation
is actually a mere figment of the imagination. None-the-less cats <are>
animals remains true.

That said then there's an idea that something like a "Comenius
language" is the universe of the words, and analytic as it were,
while humans and other reasoners are yet finite creatures,
it's a usual notion of platonism and since antiquity,
only that logical positivism had such a jarring divorce
from metaphysics, that it yet is so that metatheory or
theory at all is still a branch of metaphysics and the
technical philosophy, that a sort of common silver thread
still connects a brief account of technical metaphysics,
with a philosophy of science, without which it is bereft of
context, it's a false dichotomy reason and metaphysics.
 So, a notion like a "Comenius language", is that it's only
truisms and sort of results from axiomless natural deduction,
and that it has no paradoxes because "the Liar" is only
an artifact or sputnik of quantification like Russell's
thesis and Russell's retro-thesis, then that things like
"Ex Falso Quodlibet plus material implication" are kicked
right out or down as "quasi-modal" anyways, that there's
at least an abstract model of analytic truth, yes.
 

--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer