Re: Can there be a truth without a truthmaker?

On 4/9/24 8:15 PM, olcott wrote:

On 4/2/2024 11:50 AM, olcott wrote:

There is a great debate about whether an expression of language
can be true without a truth maker.
>
Truthmaker Maximalism defended GONZALO RODRIGUEZ-PEREYRA
https://philarchive.org/archive/RODTMD
>
A truth without a truthmaker is like a cake without a baker,
non-existent.
>
True and unprovable is self-contradictory once one understands
how true really works the way that I and Wittgenstein do.
https://www.liarparadox.org/Wittgenstein.pdf
>

 Analytic truth seems to be essentially nothing more than relations between finite strings. Copyright 2024 PL Olcott

Which means that you don;t actually understand what it means.

 *Here is my key basis for that*
 By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says that the
objects of thought (or, in another interpretation, the symbolic
expressions) are divided into types, namely: individuals, properties of
individuals, relations between individuals, properties of such
relations, etc. (with a similar hierarchy for extensions), and that
sentences of the form: " a has the property φ ", " b bears the relation
R to c ", etc. are meaningless, if a, b, c, R, φ are not of types
fitting together.
 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944
 

While the statements can be expressed in "Finite Strings", the strings themselves don't convey the full meaning.
And part of the problem, which seems to be beyond you, is that Truth can be established via an INFINITE chain of steps (but such a chain doesn't allow that Truth to be Known).
You seem to have a fundamental blind spot on the difference between something being true and it being known. Things can be True, but not known, or even knowable. You can't perform a proof with such a statement, as, if you don't know the truth of a statement, you can't validly assert that it shows something else to be true or false. But sometimes, knowing that something must be either true or false, allows you to prove something else, even if you don't know its own truth as two different proofs can be made, one with the assumption it is true, and one with the assumption it is false.