Re: Minimal Logics in the 2020's: A Meteoric Rise

On 7/5/24 11:50 PM, olcott wrote:

On 7/5/2024 6:12 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 7/5/24 6:33 PM, olcott wrote:

On 7/5/2024 5:22 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 7/5/24 5:42 PM, olcott wrote:

On 7/5/2024 4:18 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 7/5/24 4:12 PM, olcott wrote:

On 7/5/2024 2:54 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 7/5/24 1:38 PM, olcott wrote:

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Every expression such that neither X nor ~X is provable in L
is simply not a truth bearer in L. This does correctly reject
self-contradictory expressions that wold otherwise be interpreted
as the incompleteness of L.

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FALSE STATEMENT.
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Can't be false it is stipulated.

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Can't stipulate that something is true.
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That every expression of language that is {true on the basis of
its verbal meaning} must have a connection by truth preserving
operations to its {verbal meaning} is a tautology.

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But that isn't what you said above. You keep on getting your lies mixed up.
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I am fallible so the first time that I say something
it will probably not be infallible.

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Then ADMIT an error rather then say someone else is wrong because you didn't say what you meant.
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 It takes many revisions to precisely state my intuitions.
Every one is less than perfect. They keep getting better.

But, you refuse to acknoledge that you previous statements were errors, but accuse people of lying because they took you at your words.

 

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True on the basis of its verbal meaning isn't a thing in formal system, so not a Tautology, unless you mean by "verbal meaning" the meaning assigned to the term in the system.
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Se that I have to update it again because I am fallible.
Did you know that the Gnostic Demiurge concept of God is fallible?

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And that Gnosticism is just a heresy that is inconsistent, and thus not true.
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It is a notion of God as an ordinary human that also was the
sole creator. Ultimately only an omniscient being could make
the 100% reliable call on this.

But such a God could not do what he did.

 

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That every expression of language that is {true on the basis
of its meaning expressed using language} must have a connection
by truth preserving operations to its {meaning expressed using
language} is a tautology.

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No, only if you restrict the language it can use. For instance, On the basis of natural language Cats are Cats is a statement that is true by the meaning of the words, as it Blurgs are Blurgs. But in a system that doesn't define Cats, or Blurgs (like basic mathematics) there is not possible connection by truth preserving operations to the any meaning since it uses undefined terms in the system.
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You simply did not pay close enough attention to what I actually said.
Try reading again fifteen more times.

But you just admitted that your words were incorrect.
They problem is when you base your arguement on incorrect definitions, it can't be a valid and sound argument.

 

You keep om forgetting that formal systems are not defined in terms of natural language, so you can't use natural language definition to work with them.
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 I didn't forget. Later on I fill in more details. When I
give all of the details all at once people are overwhelmed.

No, you contradict yourself by lying.

 

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This refutes Tarski undefinability for the entire set of
knowledge that can be expressed using language.

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But that isn't what Tarski was talking about.
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After all, you STILL can't give a consitant value for the expression True(L, x) for x defined in L as ~True(L,x).
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 The whole purpose of my two decades of primary research on this
it to reject pathological expressions types as not truth bearers.
The expression that you provided was not even pathological.
~True(English, "cats are dogs") is true.

But you CAN'T "reject" them the way you are trying without rejecting all of the logic system that allowed them.
Your problem is you just don't understand how logic works, and thus, keep on trying to make systems that are just inadiquite to the actual tasks people use logic for.

 

Clearly our language allows us to define an x that way, and whatever value True(L,x) is defined (either True or False) it becomes a contradiction.
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The primary purpose of my two decades worth of primary research
is to recognize and reject pathological expressions.

But the problem is, some of them are ALLOWED by their systems.
For instance, it is IMPOSSIBLE to keep a system Turing Complete and also define that you can't build an program from a specified decider and have it act contrary to that deciders decision.
IMPOSSIBLE.
So your goal is just impossible.

 

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It sure as Hell does not get confused by any pathological
expressions that refer to themselves such as the key
expression that attempt to refute truthmaker maximalism:
This sentence has no truthmaker

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And why not? what is the value of True(L,x) from above?
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There is no sequence of truth preserving operations
that can reach the Liar Paradox or its negation.

So?
If you assume a definition as a predicate of True(L, x) you create a sequence of truth preserving operations that result in a contradiction when we define x in L as ~True(L,x).
This shows that there can be no definition as a predicate of True(L,x).

 

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The accurate model of the actual world is expressed
using formal language and formalized natural language.
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and can't be an completely accurate model of the actual world, as we don't know enough about it.

 It can be sufficiently complete have all the details that
it needs and no more.
 

Nope, as that requirement isn't definitive. The "system" itself has no "needs", it is the user of the system, that the system doesn't know about.
Yes, some systems can be "good enough" for some limited uses, but those limits needs to be carefullly defined and obeyed.
Thus, you don't have "THE accurate model of the actual world" but "A some-what accurate enough model of a sub-system of the world, good enough for some specific usages"