Re: This makes all Analytic(Olcott) truth computable

On 2024-08-16 21:35:21 +0000, olcott said:

On 8/16/2024 4:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 8/16/24 4:39 PM, olcott wrote:

On 8/16/2024 2:42 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 8/16/24 2:11 PM, olcott wrote:

On 8/16/2024 11:32 AM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 8/16/24 7:02 AM, olcott wrote:

On 8/15/2024 4:01 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2024-08-13 12:43:16 +0000, olcott said:
 

On 8/13/2024 6:24 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2024-08-12 13:44:33 +0000, olcott said:
 

On 8/12/2024 1:11 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2024-08-10 10:52:03 +0000, olcott said:
 

On 8/10/2024 3:13 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2024-08-09 15:29:18 +0000, olcott said:
 

On 8/9/2024 10:19 AM, olcott wrote:

On 8/9/2024 3:46 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2024-08-08 16:01:19 +0000, olcott said:
 

 It does seem that he is all hung up on not understanding
how the synonymity of bachelor and unmarried works.

 What in the synonymity, other than the synonymity itself,
would be relevant to Quine's topic?
 

 He mentions it 98 times in his paper
https://www.ditext.com/quine/quine.html
I haven't looked at it in years.
 

I don't really give a rat's ass what he said all that matters
to me is that I have defined expressions of language that are
{true on the basis of their meaning expressed in language}
so that I have analytic(Olcott) to make my other points.

 That does not justify lying.
 

 I never lie. Sometimes I make mistakes.
It looks like you only want to dodge the actual
topic with any distraction that you can find.
 Expressions of language that are {true on the basis of
their meaning expressed in this same language} defines
analytic(Olcott) that overcomes any objections that
anyone can possibly have about the analytic/synthetic
distinction.
 

 Expressions of language that are {true on the basis of
their meaning expressed in this same language} defines
analytic(Olcott) that overcomes any objections that
anyone can possibly have about the analytic/synthetic
distinction.
 This makes all Analytic(Olcott) truth computable or the
expression is simply untrue because it lacks a truthmaker.

 No, it doesn't. An algrithm or at least a proof of existence of an
algrithm makes something computable. You  can't compute if you con't
know how. The truth makeker of computability is an algorithm.
 

 There is either a sequence of truth preserving operations from
the set of expressions stipulated to be true (AKA the verbal
model of the actual world) to x or x is simply untrue. This is
how the Liar Paradox is best refuted.

 Nice to see that you con't disagree.
 

 When the idea that I presented is fully understood
it abolishes the whole notion of undecidability.

 If you can't prove atl least that you have an interesting idea
nobody is going to stody it enough to understood.

 In epistemology (theory of knowledge), a self-evident proposition
is a proposition that is known to be true by understanding its meaning
without proof https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-evidence

 Self-evident propositions are uninteresting.
 

 *This abolishes the notion of undecidability*
As with all math and logic we have expressions of language
that are true on the basis of their meaning expressed
in this same language. Unless expression x has a connection
(through a sequence of true preserving operations) in system
F to its semantic meanings expressed in language L of F
x is simply untrue in F.

 But you clearly don't understand the meaning of "undecidability"

 Not at all. I am doing the same sort thing that ZFC
did to conquer Russell's Paradox.
 

 If you want to do that, you need to start at the basics are totally reformulate logic.
 

 ZFC didn't need to do that. All they had to do is
redefine the notion of a set so that it was no longer
incoherent.
 

 I guess you haven't read the papers of Zermelo and Fraenkel. They created a new definition of what a set was, and then showed what that implies, since by changing the definitions, all the old work of set theory has to be thrown out, and then we see what can be established.
 

 None of this is changing any more rules. All
of these are the effects of the change of the
definition of a set.

Zermelo didn't change the rules of logic. He did change the rules
of set theory and demostrated that the new roules permitted much
of what was reasonable to expect.
--
Mikko