Re: This is how I overturn the Tarski Undefinability theorem

On 8/31/24 2:48 PM, olcott wrote:

*This is how I overturn the Tarski Undefinability theorem*
An analytic expression of language is any expression of formal or natural language that can be proven true or false entirely on the basis of a connection to its semantic meaning in this same language.
 This connection must be through a sequence of truth preserving operations from expression x of language L to meaning M in L. A lack of such connection from x or ~x in L is construed as x is not a truth bearer in L.

Right, so when x in L is defined to be !True(L,x) does such a connetion exist?

 Tarski's Liar Paradox from page 248
    It would then be possible to reconstruct the antinomy of the liar
    in the metalanguage, by forming in the language itself a sentence
    x such that the sentence of the metalanguage which is correlated
    with x asserts that x is not a true sentence.
    https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf

Right, he *SHOWS* that in the system, it is possible to create the statement that
x (in L) is defined to be ~True(L, x)
PERIOD.
Try to show where is proof of such a statement is wrong.
Your problem is you don't understand what Tarski is doing at all, so you can't point to a statement that is in error, just that you think the answer must be wrong. THAT is not a "refuation", just proof that it is likely that the error is in *YOUR* ideas,
So, if you claim that such a statement x can neither be established or refuted in L, then BY THE DEFINITION of the "True" prediciate, that is that True is TRUE if the statement is actually true, while FALSE for all other cases, either being refutable, or being a non-truth bearer, then True(L, x) must be FALSE, but that means that !True(L, x) must be TRUE, and thus x *IS* establish as a TRUE statement, derivable from the fact that True(L, x) was FALSE, and the definition of negation.
This means that there exist a statement (x) which is TRUE, but True(L,x) is FALSE, and thus the predicate True can not meet its definition.
This shows that no such predicate can meet that definition.
Unless you can resolve THAT contradiciton somehow, you have to accept the conclusion, or just admit you don't understand how logic works.

 Formalized as:
x ∉ True if and only if p
where the symbol 'p' represents the whole sentence x
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
 *Formalized as Prolog*

But that is invalid, as Prolog doesn't support the needed degree of logic.

?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.

As Prolog admits here. All you have done here is proven that you don't actually understand how logic works.

 When formalized as Prolog unify_with_occurs_check()
detects a cycle in the directed graph of the evaluation
sequence proving the LP is not a truth bearer.

Which is meaningless as Prolog doesn't support the needed level of logic, and proves that YOU don't support the needed level of logic, and thus your "arguement" is just invalid, and you claims just lies.

 The purpose of this work was to show that algorithmic
undecidability is a misconception providing more details
than Wittgenstein's rebuttal of Gödel.
 https://www.liarparadox.org/Wittgenstein.pdf
 

Which was a statement taken from unpublished papers, and was apparently from before Wittgenstein had even read the actual Godel paper.
We don't know if Wittgenstein even continued to believe this, with the question, if he did, why did he not publish it?