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On 2024-08-31 18:48:18 +0000, olcott said:It may seem that way if you have no idea what
*This is how I overturn the Tarski Undefinability theorem*According to Prolog semantics "false" would also be a correct
An analytic expression of language is any expression of formal or natural language that can be proven true or false entirely on the basis of a connection to its semantic meaning in this same language.
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This connection must be through a sequence of truth preserving operations from expression x of language L to meaning M in L. A lack of such connection from x or ~x in L is construed as x is not a truth bearer in L.
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Tarski's Liar Paradox from page 248
It would then be possible to reconstruct the antinomy of the liar
in the metalanguage, by forming in the language itself a sentence
x such that the sentence of the metalanguage which is correlated
with x asserts that x is not a true sentence.
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf
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Formalized as:
x ∉ True if and only if p
where the symbol 'p' represents the whole sentence x
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
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*Formalized as Prolog*
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
response.
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).To the extend Prolog formalizes anything, that only formalizes
false.
the condept of self-reference. I does not say anything about
int.
When formalized as Prolog unify_with_occurs_check()Prolog does not say anything about truth-bearers.
detects a cycle in the directed graph of the evaluation
sequence proving the LP is not a truth bearer.
I showed it to everyone knowing (a)(b)(c)The purpose of this work was to show that algorithmicWhich it didn't show.
undecidability is a misconception providing more details
than Wittgenstein's rebuttal of Gödel.
--https://www.liarparadox.org/Wittgenstein.pdf
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