Re: I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases

On 2024-09-11 12:16:46 +0000, olcott said:

On 9/11/2024 2:18 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2024-09-10 13:32:25 +0000, olcott said:
 

On 9/10/2024 4:34 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2024-09-09 17:38:04 +0000, olcott said:
 

On 9/7/2024 3:46 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2024-09-06 23:41:16 +0000, Richard Damon said:
 

On 9/6/24 8:24 AM, olcott wrote:

On 9/6/2024 6:43 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2024-09-03 12:49:11 +0000, olcott said:
 

On 9/3/2024 5:44 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2024-09-02 12:24:38 +0000, olcott said:
 

On 9/2/2024 3:29 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2024-09-01 12:56:16 +0000, olcott said:
 

On 8/31/2024 10:04 PM, olcott wrote:

*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
 knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem
 

 With a Justified true belief, in the Gettier cases
the observer does not know enough to know its true
yet it remains stipulated to be true.
 My original correction to this was a JTB such that the
justification necessitates the truth of the belief.
 With a [Sufficiently Justified belief], it is stipulated
that the observer does have a sufficient reason to accept
the truth of the belief.

 What could be a sufficient reason? Every justification of every
belief involves other belifs that could be false.

 For the justification to be sufficient the consequence of
the belief must be semantically entailed by its justification.

 If the belief is about something real then its justification
involves claims about something real. Nothing real is certain.
 

 I don't think that is correct.
My left hand exists right now even if it is
a mere figment of my own imagination and five
minutes ago never existed.

 As I don't know and can't (at least now) verify whether your left
hand exists or ever existed I can't regard that as a counter-
example.
 

If the belief is not about something real then it is not clear
whether it is correct to call it "belief".

 *An axiomatic chain of inference based on this*
By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says
that the objects of thought (or, in another interpretation,
the symbolic expressions) are divided into types, namely:
individuals, properties of individuals, relations between
individuals, properties of such relations, etc.
 ...sentences of the form: " a has the property φ ", " b bears
the relation R to c ", etc. are meaningless, if a, b, c, R, φ
are not of types fitting together.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944

 The concepts of knowledge and truth are applicable to the knowledge
whether that is what certain peple meant when using those words.
Whether or to what extent that theory can be said to be true is
another problem.
 

 The fundamental architectural overview of all Prolog implementations
is the same True(x) means X is derived by applying Rules (AKA truth preserving operations) to Facts.

 But Prolog can't even handle full first order logic, only basic propositions.

 The logic behind Prolog is restricted enough that incompleteness cannot
be differentiated from consistency. It seems that Olcott wants a logic
with that impossibility.

 It is not that incompleteness cannot be differentiated
from inconsistency it is that the inconsistency of
self-contradiction has been mistaken for undecidability
instead of invalid input.

 Of course incompleteness can be differentiated from incosistency.

 Self-contradictory expressions are incorrect deemed to be
undecidable expressions instead of invalid expressions.

 Invalid expression is a non-expression (i.e., a string that does
not satisfy the syntax rules of an expression) used as if it were
an expression.
 

Is this "actual piece of shit" "a rainbow" or "a car engine"?
I can't decide, therefore the formal system is incomplete.
(The correct answer is neither, yet the correct answer is not allowed).

 Who allows the question but not the correct answer? You?
 

 The expressivity of language allows this.

Depends on the language. The formal language of the first order Peano
arithmetic does not allow questions.
--
Mikko