Re: Mathematical incompleteness has always been a misconception --- Tarski --- YES !!!

On 02/08/2025 07:32 AM, olcott wrote:

On 2/8/2025 4:45 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2025-02-07 16:21:01 +0000, olcott said:
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On 2/7/2025 4:34 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2025-02-06 14:46:55 +0000, olcott said:
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On 2/6/2025 2:02 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2025-02-05 16:03:21 +0000, olcott said:
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On 2/5/2025 1:44 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2025-02-04 16:11:08 +0000, olcott said:
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On 2/4/2025 3:22 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2025-02-03 16:54:08 +0000, olcott said:
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On 2/3/2025 9:07 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2025-02-03 03:30:46 +0000, olcott said:
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On 2/2/2025 3:27 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2025-02-01 14:09:54 +0000, olcott said:
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On 2/1/2025 3:19 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2025-01-31 13:57:02 +0000, olcott said:
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On 1/31/2025 3:24 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2025-01-30 23:10:18 +0000, olcott said:
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Within the entire body of analytical truth any
expression of language that has no sequence of
formalized semantic deductive inference steps from
the formalized semantic foundational truths of this
system are simply untrue in this system. (Isomorphic
to provable from axioms).

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If there is a misconception then you have misconceived
something. It is well
known that it is possible to construct a formal theory
where some formulas
are neither provble nor disprovable.

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This is well known.

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And well undeerstood. The claim on the subject line is
false.

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a fact or piece of information that shows that something
exists or is true:
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/ proof

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We require that terms of art are used with their term-of-
art meaning and

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The fundamental base meaning of Truth[0] itself remains the
same
no matter what idiomatic meanings say.

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Irrelevant as the subject line does not mention truth.
Therefore, no need to revise my initial comment.

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The notion of truth is entailed by the subject line:
misconception means ~True.

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The title line means that something is misunderstood but that
something
is not the meaning of "true".

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It is untrue because it is misunderstood.

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Mathematical incompleteness is not a claim so it cannot be untrue.

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That mathematical incompleteness coherently exists <is> claim.

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Yes, but you didn't claim that.
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The closest that it can possibly be interpreted as true would
be that because key elements of proof[0] have been specified
as not existing in proof[math] math is intentionally made less
than complete.

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Math is not intentionally incomplete.

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You paraphrased what I said incorrectly.

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No, I did not paraphrase anything.
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Proof[math] was defined to have less capability than Proof[0].

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That is not a part of the definition but it is a consequence of the
definition. Much of the lost capability is about things that are
outside of the scope of mathemiatics and formal theories.
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When one thinks of math as only pertaining to numbers then math
is inherently very limited.

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That's right. That limited area should be called "number theory",
not "mathematics".
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When one applies something like
Montague Grammar to formalize every detail of natural language
semantics then math takes on much more scope.

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It is not possible to specify every detail of a natural language.
In order to do so one should know every detail of a natural language.
While one is finding out the language changes so that the already
aquired knowledge is invalid.
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When we see this then we see "incompleteness" is a mere artificial
contrivance.

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Hallucinations are possible but only proofs count in mathematics.
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True(x) always means that a connection to a semantic
truthmaker exists. When math does this differently it is simply
breaking the rules.

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Mathematics does not make anything about "True(x)". Some branches care
about semantic connections, some don't. Much of logic is about comparing
semantic connections to syntactic ones.
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Many theories are incomplete,
intertionally or otherwise, but they don't restrict the rest of math.
But there are areas of matheimatics that are not yet studied.
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When-so-ever any expression of formal or natural language X lacks
a connection to its truthmaker X remains untrue.

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An expresion can be true in one interpretation and false in another.

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I am integrating the semantics into the evaluation as its full
context.

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Then you cannot have all the advantages of formal logic. In particular,
you need to be able to apply and verify formally invalid inferences.

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All of the rules of correct reasoning (correcting the errors of
formal logic) are merely semantic connections between finite strings:

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There are no semantic connections between uninterpreted strings.
With different interpretations different connections can be found.
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When we do not break the evaluation of an expression of language
into its syntax and semantics such that these are evaluated
separately and use something like Montague Semantics to formalize
the semantics as relations between finite strings then
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it is clear that any expression of language that lacks a connection
through a truthmaker to the semantics that makes it true simply remains
untrue.
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In the big picture way that truth really works there cannot
possibly be true[0](x) that is not provable[0](x) where x
is made true by finite strings expressing its semantic meanings.
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When one finite string expression of language is known to be true
other expressions are know to be semantically entailed.

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Only if they are connected with (semantic or other) connections that
are known to preserve truth.
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Yes, there must be truth preserving operations.
Formal logic fails at this some of the time.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_explosion
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The only thing that is actually semantically entailed by a
contradiction is FALSE. (A & ~A) ⊨ FALSE
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I fail to understand how anyone could be gullible enough into
being conned into believing that anything besides FALSE is
entailed by a contradiction.
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When we do this and require an expression of formal or natural
language
to have a semantic connection to its truthmaker then true[0] cannot
exist apart from provable[0].

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Maybe, maybe not. Without the full support of formal logic it is
hard to
prove. An unjustified faith does not help.

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It all has always boiled down to semantic entailment.

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Which is hard to show without the full support of formal logic.
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We simply leave most of formal logic as it is with some changes:
(1) Non-truth preserving operations are eliminated.
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    A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only if
    it takes a form that makes it impossible for the premises
    to be true and the conclusion nevertheless to be false.
    https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/
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*We correct the above fundamental mistake*
    A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only if
    it takes a form that the conclusion is a necessary
    consequence of its premises.
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(2) Semantics is fully integrated into every expression of
language with each unique natural language sense meaning
of a word having its own GUID.
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True[math] can only exist apart from Provable[math] within
the narrow minded, idiomatic use of these terms. This is
NOT the way that True[0] and Provable[0] actually work.

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If you want that to be true you need to define True[math] differently
from the way "truth" is used by mathimaticians.

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We could equally define a "dead cat" to be a kind of {cow}.
Math does not get to change the way that truth really works,
when math tries to do this math is incorrect.

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Math does not care how truth works outside mathematics. But the truth
about mathematics works the way truth usually does.
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Math is not allowed to break these rules without making math incorrect.
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My point is much more clear when we see that Tarski attempts
to show that True[0] is undefinable.
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf

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Tarski did not attempt to show that True[0] is undefinable. He showed
quite successfully that arthmetic truth is undefinable. Whether that
proof applies to your True[0] is not yet determined.

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Tarski is the foremost author of the whole notion of every
kind of truth. "snow is white" because within the actual state
of affairs the color of snow is perceived by humans to be white.

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Many philosophers before and after Tarski have tried to find out what
truth really is and how it works.
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And I am finishing the job. I may have only one month left.
The cancer treatment that I will have next month has a 5% chance
of killing me and a 1% chance of ruining my brain. It also has
about a 70% chance of giving me at least two more years of life.
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 Instead of just usual model theory and axiomatics
and "what's true in the logical theory", "what's
not falsified in the scientific theory",

you can
have a theory where the quantity is truth, and
then there's a Comenius language of it that only
truisms are well-formed formulas, then the Liar
"paradox" is only a prototype of a fallacy, then

about getting into that arithmetic has no standard
models means that really there's fragments and
extensions, and a standard line down the middle.
 Then Tarski is kind of cool but kind of a flake,
and relational algebra mostly belongs to where
relations are primary, and the effort to "eliminate
constants" or "reduce it to terms" eventually fails.
 I read into Tarski from some of his books and from
the Fefermans' biography of him in my "Moment and
Motion" podcasts.
 I'm more of a fan of Dana Scott but I'm not necessarily
a follower of the Berkeley school of logic or so much
the Warsaw school, though, I like Lukasiewicz.