Re: Why Tarski is wrong --- Montague, Davidson and Knowledge Ontology providing situational context.

Am Fri, 21 Mar 2025 17:54:53 -0500 schrieb olcott:

On 3/21/2025 6:48 AM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 3/20/25 11:49 PM, olcott wrote:

On 3/20/2025 8:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 3/20/25 6:14 PM, olcott wrote:

On 3/19/2025 8:59 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 3/19/25 5:50 PM, olcott wrote:

On 3/18/2025 10:04 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

Part of the problem is that most of what we call "Human
Knowledge" isn't logically defined truth, but is just "Emperical
Knowledge", for which we

>
The set of human knowledge that can be expressed in language
provides the means to compute True(X).

>
Of course not, as then True(x) just can't handle a statement whose
truth is currently unknown, which it MUST be able to handle
>

It employs the same algorithm as Prolog:
Can X be proven on the basis of Facts?

>
And thus you just admitted that your system doesn't even QUALIFY to
be the system that Tarski is talking about.
You don't seem to understand that fact, because apparently you can't
actually understand any logic system more coplicated than what Prolog
can handle.
>

This concise specification is air-tight.
The set of all human general knowledge that can be expressed using
language has no undecidability or undefinability.
>

Nope. Proven otherwise, and you are just showing your stupidity in
maintaining that claim.
 

Then try and show ALL OF THE DETAILS OF how when one starts with basic
facts and only applies truth preserving operations that True(X) is not
always correct.

Look no further than Gödel's proof: the sentence "this sentence is not
true" is not true, and neither is its negation, where one of them
must be, since they are syntactically correct.

--
Am Sat, 20 Jul 2024 12:35:31 +0000 schrieb WM in sci.math:
It is not guaranteed that n+1 exists for every n.