Re: How a True(X) predicate can be defined for the set of analytic knowledge

On 3/27/25 9:44 PM, olcott wrote:

On 3/27/2025 6:08 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 3/27/25 9:03 AM, olcott wrote:

On 3/27/2025 5:58 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2025-03-26 18:01:14 +0000, olcott said:
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On 3/26/2025 3:36 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2025-03-25 14:56:33 +0000, olcott said:
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On 3/25/2025 5:19 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2025-03-22 17:53:28 +0000, olcott said:
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On 3/22/2025 11:43 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2025-03-21 12:49:06 +0000, olcott said:
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On 3/21/2025 3:57 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2025-03-20 15:02:42 +0000, olcott said:
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On 3/20/2025 8:09 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2025-03-20 02:42:53 +0000, olcott said:
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It is stipulated that analytic knowledge is limited to the
set of knowledge that can be expressed using language or
derived by applying truth preserving operations to elements
of this set.

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A simple example is the first order group theory.
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When we begin with a set of basic facts and all inference
is limited to applying truth preserving operations to
elements of this set then a True(X) predicate cannot possibly
be thwarted.

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There is no computable predicate that tells whether a sentence
of the first order group theory can be proven.
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Likewise there currently does not exist any finite
proof that the Goldbach Conjecture is true or false
thus True(GC) is a type mismatch error.

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However, it is possible that someone finds a proof of the conjecture
or its negation. Then the predicate True is no longer complete.
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The set of all human general knowledge that can
be expressed using language gets updated.
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When we redefine logic systems such that they begin
with set of basic facts and are only allowed to
apply truth preserving operations to these basic
facts then every element of the system is provable
on the basis of these truth preserving operations.

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However, it is possible (and, for sufficiently powerful sysems, certain)
that the provability is not computable.
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When we begin with basic facts and only apply truth preserving
to the giant semantic tautology of the set of human knowledge
that can be expressed using language then every element in this
set is reachable by these same truth preserving operations.

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The set of human knowledge that can be expressed using language
is not a tautology.
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tautology, in logic, a statement so framed that
it cannot be denied without inconsistency.

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And human knowledge is not.

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What is taken to be knowledge might possibly be false.

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What actually <is> knowledge is impossibly false by
definition.

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What is presented as the body of human knowledge either is a very small
part of actual knowledge or contains false claims.
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I am NOT referring to what is merely presented as the body
of general knowledge, I am referring to the actual body of
general knowledge. Within this hypothesis it is easy to see
that True(X) would be infallible.

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In that case your True(X) is uncomputable and any theory that contains
it is incomplete.
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The body of general knowledge that can be expressed
using language is defined to be complete. The moment
that new knowledge that can be expressed in language
comes into existence it is added to the set.
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No its not. We KNOW there are things we don't know yet, but hope to.
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 As soon as the first person knows new general knowledge
and this knowledge can be written down (unlike the
actual direct physical sensation of smelling a rose)
then this becomes an element of this set of knowledge.

In other words, you ADMIT that this is not a FORMAL LOGIC system.

 

And, the base of a logic system is STATIC and fixed.
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 The set of general knowledge that can be expressed
in language has more flexibility than that.

But not as a FORMAL LOGIC SYSTEM.

 

You just don't understand the meaning of the words you are using.
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True(X) merely tests for membership in this set;
(a) Is X a Basic Fact? Then X is true.

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Which makes it not a TRUTH test, but a KNOWLEDGE test, and thus not names right.
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 The set of all general knowledge that can be expressed in language
is a subset of all truth and only excludes unknown and unknowable.

But the Truth Predicate needs to answer about the unknown, after all, the statement whose truth is unknown, but is known to be true or false, has a truth value.

 

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(b) Can X be derived by applying truth preserving operations
     to Basic Facts? Then X is true.

And thus we can show that Tarski's statement x, which WAS derived by applying truth preseving operations in the earlier part of the work, must be answerable by the Truth Predicate, but it can't be.

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But that isn't the membershop test you just mentioned, and it is that op[eration which Tarski specifically showed can not be done.
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The problem is TRUTH can be establish via an infinite set of truth perserving operations, but knowledge can not.
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 None of this makes any actual difference in the world.
We won't be able to prevent nuclear Winter and the
extinction of humanity on the basis of knowing whether
or not the Goldbach conjecture is true.
 

So? You can't stop any of those thing if you adopt the idea that lies are ok either.
Your problem is you logic system is FUNDAMENTALLY based on LIES, and you are too stupid to understand that fact.

Ths FACT is part of that "Knowledge" that you accepted at the begining, so you can't get rid of it.
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(c) Otherwise X is not true, this does not always mean X is false.
Gibberish is not true. Self-contradictory expressions are not true.
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But we can't determine if that x was true. You definition was that it was in the set of lnowledge that we built the set on.
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Sorry, but you are just showing that you don't understand what you own words mean.