Sujet : Re: How a True(X) predicate can be defined for the set of analytic knowledge
De : polcott333 (at) *nospam* gmail.com (olcott)
Groupes : sci.logicDate : 28. Mar 2025, 21:07:22
Autres entêtes
Organisation : A noiseless patient Spider
Message-ID : <vs6vhq$39556$19@dont-email.me>
References : 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
User-Agent : Mozilla Thunderbird
On 3/28/2025 8:46 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/27/25 10:18 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/27/2025 8:54 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/27/25 9:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/27/2025 5:48 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-03-26 17:58:10 +0000, olcott said:
>
On 3/26/2025 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-03-26 02:15:26 +0000, olcott said:
>
On 3/25/2025 8:08 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/25/25 10:56 AM, olcott wrote:
On 3/25/2025 5:19 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-03-22 17:53:28 +0000, olcott said:
>
On 3/22/2025 11:43 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-03-21 12:49:06 +0000, olcott said:
>
On 3/21/2025 3:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-03-20 15:02:42 +0000, olcott said:
>
On 3/20/2025 8:09 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-03-20 02:42:53 +0000, olcott said:
>
It is stipulated that analytic knowledge is limited to the
set of knowledge that can be expressed using language or
derived by applying truth preserving operations to elements
of this set.
>
A simple example is the first order group theory.
>
When we begin with a set of basic facts and all inference
is limited to applying truth preserving operations to
elements of this set then a True(X) predicate cannot possibly
be thwarted.
>
There is no computable predicate that tells whether a sentence
of the first order group theory can be proven.
>
>
Likewise there currently does not exist any finite
proof that the Goldbach Conjecture is true or false
thus True(GC) is a type mismatch error.
>
However, it is possible that someone finds a proof of the conjecture
or its negation. Then the predicate True is no longer complete.
>
>
The set of all human general knowledge that can
be expressed using language gets updated.
>
When we redefine logic systems such that they begin
with set of basic facts and are only allowed to
apply truth preserving operations to these basic
facts then every element of the system is provable
on the basis of these truth preserving operations.
>
However, it is possible (and, for sufficiently powerful sysems, certain)
that the provability is not computable.
>
>
When we begin with basic facts and only apply truth preserving
to the giant semantic tautology of the set of human knowledge
that can be expressed using language then every element in this
set is reachable by these same truth preserving operations.
>
The set of human knowledge that can be expressed using language
is not a tautology.
>
>
tautology, in logic, a statement so framed that
it cannot be denied without inconsistency.
>
And human knowledge is not.
>
>
What is taken to be knowledge might possibly be false.
What actually <is> knowledge is impossibly false by
definition.
>
>
How do you DEFINE what is actually knowledge?
>
>
*This is a good first guess*
The set of expressions of language that have the
semantic property of true that are written down
somewhere.
>
We already know that many expressions of language that have the semantic
proerty of true are not written down anywhere.
>
Only general knowledge
>
What is "general" intended to mean here? In absense of any definition
it is too vague to really mean anything.
>
>
Reverse-engineer how you could define a set of
knowledge that is finite rather than infinite.
>
In other words, you don't understand the question.
>
>
The set of everything that anyone ever wrote
down would be finite. Most of this would be
specific knowledge Pete's dog was named Bella.
Some is general dogs are animals.
>
So, what is the DEFINITION of "General Knowledge"?
>
>
Knowledge that lacks specific details of specific situations.
A set of knowledge that can be algorithmically compressed
as a finite set of finite strings.
>
Ok, so therefore it includes all the "laws of mathematics" and the "rules of inference" and thus, the system is capable of creating the rules and properties of the Natural Numbers, so it supports the proofs of Godel and Tarski, and thus there are statements in that sytstem that are True but unprovable and no definition of the Truth Predicate can handle those,
Sorry, you are just showing you don't understand what you are talking about.
Yes it will showed the formal system can be defined
that have all kinds of issues because they were defined
incoherently.
-- Copyright 2025 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Geniushits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
How a True(X) predicate can be defined for the set of analytic knowledge
Re: How a True(X) predicate can be defined for the set of analytic knowledge