Re: How a True(X) predicate can be defined for the set of analytic knowledge

On 3/28/2025 4:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 3/28/25 3:45 PM, olcott wrote:

On 3/28/2025 5:33 AM, joes wrote:

Am Thu, 27 Mar 2025 20:44:28 -0500 schrieb olcott:

The set of all general knowledge that can be expressed in language
is a subset of all truth and only excludes unknown and unknowable.

>

Exactly, it doesn't include the unknown truths and ought to be called
Known(X). It is also contradictory since it gives NO both for
unknowns and their negation.
>

*The key defining aspect of knowledge is that it is true*

Which has been the eternal debate, how can we tell if some "fact" we
have discovered is true.
In FORMAL LOGIC (which you just dismissed) truth has a solid
definition, and we can formally PROVE some statements to be true and
formally PROVE that some statements are just false, and thus such
statements CAN become truely established knowledge. There may also be
some statements we have not established yet (and maybe can never
establish in the system) which will remain as "unknown". That doesn't
mean the statements might not be true or false, just that we don't know
the answer yet.
 

This can be incoherent unless complete semantics is fully integrated
into the formal system. There is no way that applying ONLY truth
preserving operations to basic facts can possibly result in
undecidability.
Only a valid concrete counter-example counts as a rebuttal, everything
else counts as some sort of deception.