Re: How a True(X) predicate can be defined for the set of analytic knowledge

On 3/29/2025 3:21 PM, joes wrote:

Am Sat, 29 Mar 2025 08:53:04 -0500 schrieb olcott:

On 3/29/2025 4:51 AM, joes wrote:

Am Fri, 28 Mar 2025 15:07:22 -0500 schrieb olcott:

On 3/28/2025 8:46 AM, Richard Damon wrote:

>

Ok, so therefore it includes all the "laws of mathematics" and the
"rules of inference" and thus, the system is capable of creating the
rules and properties of the Natural Numbers, so it supports the
proofs of Godel and Tarski, and thus there are statements in that
sytstem that are True but unprovable and no definition of the Truth
Predicate can handle those,

>
Yes it will showed the formal system can be defined that have all
kinds of issues because they were defined incoherently.

>
How is arithmetic (which is all it takes for Gödel's proof) incoherent?
 

To the best of my knowledge arithmetic itself cannot be incomplete
unless it can be shown that the sum of two finite strings of digits
cannot be derived.

And you think arithmetic should be incomplete or what?
 

When Provable(X) means applying truth preserving operations
to basic facts thus deriving True(X) then True(X) and ~Provable(X)
cannot possibly exist.
--
Copyright 2025 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer