Re: How a True(X) predicate can be defined for the set of analytic knowledge

On 4/1/25 2:00 PM, olcott wrote:

On 4/1/2025 1:36 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2025-03-31 18:29:32 +0000, olcott said:
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On 3/31/2025 4:04 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2025-03-30 11:20:05 +0000, olcott said:
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You have never expressed any disagreement with the starting points of
Tarski's proof. You have ever claimed that any of Tarski's inferences
were not truth preserving. But you have claimed that the last one of
these truth preservin transformation has produced a false conclusion.
>

>
It is ALWAYS IMPOSSIBLE to specify True(X) ∧ ~Provable(X)
(what Tarski proved) when-so-ever True(X) ≡ Provable(X).
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf

>
Tarski's proof was not about provability. Gödel had already proved
that there are unprovable true sentences. Tarski's work is about
definability.
>

 https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
Step (3) is self-contradictory, thus his whole proof fails.
 

Yes, and since that step was logically done, it says somewhere we assumed something incorrect. The assumption we made was that a Truth Predicate existed, so that can't be true.
You apparently don't understand how logic works.