Re: How a True(X) predicate can be defined for the set of analytic knowledge

On 4/2/2025 11:38 PM, dbush wrote:

On 4/3/2025 12:25 AM, olcott wrote:

On 4/2/2025 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:

>
We don't have to.  It was scrutinized by many experts for decades.
>
The burden of proof is on YOU to show that it is wrong.

>
Appeal to authority is an error.
Tarski says that he does not derive (1)
by applying truth preserving operations.
>

 LIAR:
 On 4/2/2025 11:13 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
 > The paragraph before that he says:
 >
 >> In accordance with the first
 >> part of Th. I we can obtain ...
 >
 > That shows that he is building that statement from his previous proof.
 >
 > So, prove him wrong or PUT UP OR SHUT UP.

<DIRECT QUOTE>
THEOREM I. (α) In whatever way the symbol 'Tr', denoting a
class of expressions, is defined in the metatheory, it will be possible
to derive from it the negation of one of the sentences which were
described in the condition (α) of the convention T;
(β) assuming that the class of all provable sentences of the metatheory
is consistent, it is impossible to construct an adequate
definition of truth in the sense of convention T on the basis of the
metatheory. ...
Should we succeed in constructing in the metalanguage
a correct definition of truth, then ...
It would
then be possible to reconstruct the antinomy of the liar in the
metalanguage, by forming in the language itself a sentence x
such that the sentence of the metalanguage which is correlated
with x asserts that x is not a true sentence.
</DIRECT QUOTE>
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf
--
Copyright 2025 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer