Re: How a True(X) predicate can be defined for the set of analytic knowledge

On 4/3/25 5:48 PM, olcott wrote:

On 4/3/2025 6:15 AM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 4/2/25 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:

On 4/2/2025 10:13 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 4/2/25 10:59 PM, olcott wrote:

On 4/2/2025 9:00 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 4/2/25 9:40 PM, olcott wrote:

On 4/2/2025 5:09 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 4/2/25 12:05 PM, olcott wrote:

On 4/2/2025 4:43 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2025-04-01 18:00:56 +0000, olcott said:
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On 4/1/2025 1:36 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2025-03-31 18:29:32 +0000, olcott said:
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On 3/31/2025 4:04 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2025-03-30 11:20:05 +0000, olcott said:
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You have never expressed any disagreement with the starting points of
Tarski's proof. You have ever claimed that any of Tarski's inferences
were not truth preserving. But you have claimed that the last one of
these truth preservin transformation has produced a false conclusion.
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It is ALWAYS IMPOSSIBLE to specify True(X) ∧ ~Provable(X)
(what Tarski proved) when-so-ever True(X) ≡ Provable(X).
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf

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Tarski's proof was not about provability. Gödel had already proved
that there are unprovable true sentences. Tarski's work is about
definability.

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https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
Step (3) is self-contradictory, thus his whole proof fails.

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Irrelevant. As Traski clearly points out, (3) can be derived from (1) and
(2) with a truth preserving transformation.
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(3) is false, thus his whole proof is dead.
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And if (3) is false, then one of (1) or (2) must be false,

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(1) is merely a false assumption that stands on its own.

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No, (1) is the result of a previous proof.
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Prove that. I can prove otherwise. PUT UP OR SHUT UP
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The paragraph before that he says:
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In accordance with the first
part of Th. I we can obtain ...

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That shows that he is building that statement from his previous proof.
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So, prove him wrong or PUT UP OR SHUT UP.

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I merely have to prove that you are wrong
about deriving (1) from truth preserving operations.
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf
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So, you can't read the article you post?
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 <DIRECT QUOTE>
THEOREM I. (α) In whatever way the symbol 'Tr', denoting a
class of expressions, is defined in the metatheory, it will be possible
to derive from it the negation of one of the sentences which were
described in the condition (α) of the convention T;
 (β) assuming that the class of all provable sentences of the metatheory
is consistent, it is impossible to construct an adequate
definition of truth in the sense of convention T on the basis of the
metatheory. ...
 Should we succeed in constructing in the metalanguage
a correct definition of truth, then ...
 It would
then be possible to reconstruct the antinomy of the liar in the
metalanguage, by forming in the language itself a sentence x
such that the sentence of the metalanguage which is correlated
with x asserts that x is not a true sentence.
</DIRECT QUOTE>
 https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf
 

So, what is the ERROR?
I guess you need to SHUT UP.
Sorry, but you are just showing that you are just a ignorant and stupid pathological liar that doesn't know what he is talking about.
Note, he is just giving the rough sketch of the proof here, as he mentions in the footnote:
I take this opportunity of mentioning that Th. I and the sketch of its
proof was only added to the present work after it had already gone to press.
Note, he calls it a "sketch", as he is presuming the reader has read Godel and understands his proof which he heavily leans on.
Godel has proved that we CAN construct in the meta-language the antimony of the liar, so if that is what you are going to complain about, show the error in Godel.