On 11/16/2024 08:18 PM, Jim Burns wrote:
On 11/16/2024 7:17 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 11/16/2024 02:46 PM, Jim Burns wrote:
On 11/16/2024 5:31 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 11/16/2024 12:29 PM, Jim Burns wrote:
On 11/16/2024 12:07 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 11/16/2024 08:58 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 11/16/2024 02:22 AM, Jim Burns wrote:
On 11/15/2024 9:52 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 11/15/2024 02:37 PM, Jim Burns wrote:
On 11/15/2024 4:32 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>
Ah, yet according to Mirimanoff,
there do not exist standard models of integers,
>
If it is true that
our domain of discourse is a model of ST+PQ
then it is true that
our domain of discourse holds a standard integer.model.
What is Mirimanoff's argument that
it doesn't exist?
>
Mirimanoff's? Russell's Paradox.
>
ST+PQ does not suffer from claiming
that the set of all non.self.membered sets
is self.membered or claiming it isn't.
>
I don't say "infinity" is an axiom
primarily because
"infinity" is not an axiom of ST+PQ
ST+PQ:
⎛ set {} exists
⎜ set x∪{y} exists
⎜ set.extensionality
⎜ plurality ⦃z:P(z)⦄ exists
⎝ plurality.extensionality
>
"Infinity exists" ==
"the minimal inductive plurality exists"
is a theorem of those axioms.
>
^- Fragment
>
No.
The minimal inductive plurality is
a standard model of the integers.
>
Let's recall an example geometrically of what's
so inductively and not so in the limit.
>
Take a circle and draw a diameter, then bisect
the diameter resulting diameters of common circles,
all sharing a common diameter, vertical, say.
>
Then, notice the length of the circle, is
same, as the sum of the lengths of the half-diameter
circles, their sum.
>
So, repeat his dividing ad infinitum. In the limit,
the length is that of the diameter, not the perimeter,
while inductively, it's the diameter.
>
Thusly, a clear example "not.first.false" being
"ultimately.untrue".
>
A finite sequence of claims, each claim of which
is true.or.not.first.false is
a finite sequence of claims, each claim of which
is true.
>
The reason that that's true is that
THE SEQUENCE OF CLAIMS is finite.
>
Whatever those CLAIMS refer to,
none of those CLAIMS are first.false.
(They're each not.first.false.)
>
Since none of those CLAIMS are first.false,
none of those CLAIMS are false.
(That sequence is finite.)
>
What those claims are ABOUT doesn't affect that.
For example,
being ABOUT an indefinite one of infinitely.many
doesn't affect that.
>
Discovering
a finite sequence of claims, each claim of which
is true.or.not.first.false
in which there IS an untrue claim
is akin to
counting the eggs in a carton and
discovering that, there, in that carton,
7 is NOT between 6 and 8.
There is a problem, but not with mathematics.
>
Then, with regards to your fragment,
>
...the minimal inductive plurality...
>
congratulations,
>
Thank you.
>
you have ignored Russell his paradox and so on
>
No.
>
Selecting axioms which do not suffer from claiming
that the set of all non.self.membered sets
is self.membered or claiming it isn't
is not ignoring Russel,
it is responding to Russell.
>
Russell points out that
_we do not want_ to claim
that the set of all non.self.membered sets
is self.membered or claiming it isn't.
>
We respond: Okay, we'll stop doing that.
>
and quite fully revived Frege and given yourself
a complete theory and consistent as it may be, and
can entirely ignore all of 20'th century mathematics.
>
It's small, .... Fragment
>
The minimal inductive plurality.
Big or small, that's the thing,
the whole thing, and nothing but the thing.
>
Bzzt, flake-out.
It's not pretty the act of making lies.
>
Tell me what you think is a lie:
>
>
Quote what I wrote which you think is a lie:
>
>
>
Well, it's among what you clipped because it was un-answerable,
and includes that comprehension of an ordinary inductive set
results an extra-ordinary, which the theory you mentioned
made no mention of so is fair game for expansion of comprehension,
then also this "yin-yang ad-infinitum" for both "measures
do/don't add up" and also "not.first.false is not guar-an-teed".
Also the usual Zeno bridge bit, there are quite a few things
that aren't considered apropos yet evidence themselves,
with regards to "standard" and "only with the means of
induction after a few fundamental theorems", "half-standard",
though, often I wouldn't necessarily attach them to the
very small theories you mentioned, except that they follow.
You might find "Chrysippus' moods" help escape "Plotinus' funks".
(Chrysippus makes five intensional moods for the evaluation
of syllogism that result what otherwise make for rotten
fallacies of 'material implication', to be excluded, or,
"Aristotle reads everything twice to check".)
The "purely inductive inference" is "merely inductive inference",
has that often it's possible to make checks with inductive
inference, yet, not proofs. Sometimes it is, that's usually
called "closed categories", which mathematics is not, without
quite an apparatus.
So, good sir, with regards to a "lie" and whether one who
makes a statement "knows the un-truth", of the statement,
as with regards to making a statement as positionally
"within mathematics we're conscientious and further we
care", makes for a necessity that thusly is agreed,
is vouched, to accept whatever mathematical objects
exist as "true", in whatever theories they may be
or howsoever they're arrived at logically (and by
that I mean a modal, temporal, relevance logic).
To deny or even ignore that when prompted results "a lie".
Then here it was "Russell's lie" that you handed off,
which was, "a lie". A second-hand lie, as it were.
Re: Incompleteness of Cantor's enumeration of the rational numbers
Re: Incompleteness of Cantor's enumeration of the rational numbers (re-Vitali-ized)