Re: how (Aristotle says "potential is actual and actual is potential")

On 05/20/2024 02:28 AM, FromTheRafters wrote:

on 5/19/2024, Moebius supposed :

Am 20.05.2024 um 00:04 schrieb FromTheRafters:
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The fact that we cannot find one, in his mind, merely proves his point.

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We usually aren't able to "find" something which does not exist
(except in Mückenland of course).

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Yes, that's true, how many times has he written something akin to "Try
to find 'A', fail, therefore dark numbers."

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It's kind of like physics and 'dark matter' and 'dark energy'.
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Continuum mechanics, has that there are at least three
definitions of a continuous domain, line-reals, field-reals,
and signal-reals.
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The superclassical notions of concepts like superfluidity,
and even the behavior of light, make for that particle
mechanics is a sort of conceit, of atomism, that at once
"is" and "isn't", infinitesimal and finite, that atomism
is an original sort of superclassical concept.
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The rulial, the regular, for establishing induction,
is great and all, in the finite.
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Yet, quantification by itself rather simply in the universal,
immediately shows that induction by itself is insufficient,
when instead deductive inference shows why there are
analytical bridges over inductive impasses, and besides,
that inductive inference always needs somewhere to go,
where it ever is to arrive.
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So, on the one hand the WM-bot shows an ignorance and
a false inference, on the other, can't see it.
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"Formalism" and "nominalism" are two different things,
one can be a sort of strong mathematical platonist while
as well a sort of strong logical positivist, and indeed,
lacking either results a void.
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Aristotle the other day said something along the lines
of "the potential is actual". These days such notions
are framed like "sum-of-histories sum-of-potentials",
that the theory of the objects of physics is like so.
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So, at some point the only way to be a conscientious formalist
is to be both a strong logical positivist like usual
nominalist formalists, and a strong mathematical platonist,
and neither sort of retro-finitist, of the sort that
hasn't the actual of the platonist, or hasn't the potential
of quantification reading out the extra-ordinary.
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Or, there are cranks and cranks.
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