Re: True on the basis of meaning

On 2024-05-14 14:42:36 +0000, olcott said:

On 5/14/2024 4:08 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2024-05-13 14:48:21 +0000, olcott said:
 

On 5/13/2024 4:23 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2024-05-12 18:36:22 +0000, olcott said:
 

On 5/12/2024 1:22 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 5/12/24 2:06 PM, olcott wrote:

On 5/12/2024 12:52 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 5/12/24 1:19 PM, olcott wrote:

On 5/12/2024 10:33 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2024-05-12 14:22:25 +0000, olcott said:
 

On 5/12/2024 2:42 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2024-05-11 04:27:03 +0000, olcott said:
 

On 5/10/2024 10:49 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 5/10/24 11:35 PM, olcott wrote:

On 5/10/2024 10:16 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 5/10/24 10:36 PM, olcott wrote:

The entire body of expressions that are {true on the basis of their
meaning} involves nothing more or less than stipulated relations between
finite strings.
 

 You do know that what you are describing when applied to Formal Systems are the axioms of the system and the most primitively provable theorems.
 

 YES and there are axioms that comprise the verbal model of the
actual world, thus Quine was wrong.

 You don't understand what Quite was talking about,
 

 I don't need to know anything about what he was talking about
except that he disagreed with {true on the basis or meaning}.
I don't care or need to know how he got to an incorrect answer.
 

 

 You don't seem to understand what "Formal Logic" actually means.
 

 Ultimately it is anchored in stipulated relations between finite
strings (AKA axioms) and expressions derived from applying truth
preserving operations to these axioms.

 Which you don't seem to understand what that means.
 

 I understand this much more deeply than you do.

 In and about formal logic there is no valid deep understanding. Only
a shallow understanding can be valid.
 

 It turns out that ALL {true on the basis of meaning} that includes
ALL of logic and math has its entire foundation in relations between
finite strings. Some are stipulated to be true (axioms) and some
are derived by applying truth preserving operations to these axioms.

 Usually the word "true" is not used when talking about uninterpreted
formal systems. Axioms and what can be inferred from axioms are called
"theorems". Theorems can be true in some interpretations and false in
another. If the system is incosistent then there is no interpretation
where all axioms are true.
 

 I am not talking about how these things are usually spoken of. I am
talking about my unique contribution to the actual philosophical
foundation of {true on the basis of meaning}.

 Which means you need to be VERY clear about what you claim to be "usually spoken of" and what is your unique contribution.
 You then need to show how your contribution isn't in conflict with the classical parts, but follows within its definitions.
 If you want to say that something in the classical theory is not actually true, then you need to show how removing that piece doesn't affect the system. This seems to be a weak point of yours, you think you can change a system, and not show that the system can still exist as it was.
 

 This is entirely comprised of relations between finite strings:
some of which are stipulated to have the semantic value of Boolean
true, and others derived from applying truth preserving operations
to these finite string.
 This is approximately equivalent to proofs from axioms. It is not
exactly the same thing because an infinite sequence of inference
steps may sometimes be required. It is also not exactly the same
because some proofs are not restricted to truth preserving operations.
 

 So, what effect does that difference have?
 You seem here to accept that some truths are based on an infinite sequence of operations, while you admit that proofs are finite sequences, but it seems you still assert that all truths must be provable.
 

 I did not use the term "provable" or "proofs" these only apply to
finite sequences. {derived from applying truth preserving operations}
can involve infinite sequences.

 But if true can come out of an infinite sequences, and some need such an infinite sequence, but proof requires a finite sequence, that shows that there will exists some statements are true, but not provable.
 

 ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
 When we look at the way that {true on the basis of meaning}
actually works, then all epistemological antinomies are simply untrue.

 And Godel would agree to that. You just don't understand what that line 14 means.
 

 It can be proven in a finite sequence of steps that
epistemological antinomies are simply untrue.

 And also that every claim from which an epistemological antinomy could
be proven must be untrue.
 

 There are no sequence of truth preserving operations from expressions that have been stipulated to be true that derive X or ~X when X is an
epistemological antinomy, thus X is rejected as not a truth-bearer.

 That depends on stipulations. If someone stipulates enough then
it is possible to derive an epistemological antimomy.
 

 An accurate model of all of the general knowledge of the actual world.
Expressions that are stipulated to be true must actually be true.

Does that mean that everything uncertain is excluded from "general
knowledge of the actual world"? If so, then very little is left.
--
Mikko