Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --Mendelson--

On 4/26/24 11:28 AM, olcott wrote:

On 4/26/2024 3:42 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2024-04-25 14:27:23 +0000, olcott said:
>

On 4/25/2024 3:26 AM, Mikko wrote:

epistemological antinomy

>
It <is> part of the current (thus incorrect) definition
of undecidability because expressions of language that
are neither true nor false (epistemological antinomies)
do prove undecidability even though these expressions
are not truth bearers thus not propositions.

>
That a definition is current does not mean that is incorrect.
>

 ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)

Which you don't seem to understnand what the pronounce reference.
Godel's "G" is NOT an "Epistemological Antinomy", and the fact you think this statement is saying it is just proves your utter STUPIDITY.

 

An epistemological antinomy can only be an undecidable sentence
if it can be a sentence. What epistemological antinomies you
can find that can be expressed in, say, first order goup theory
or first order arithmetic or first order set tehory?
>

 It only matters that they can be expressed in some formal system.
If they cannot be expressed in any formal system then Gödel is
wrong for a different reason.

But they CAN be expressed, as Godel shows IN META-F (not necessarily in F, where G is expressed).

 Minimal Type Theory (YACC BNF)
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/331859461_Minimal_Type_Theory_YACC_BNF
 I created MTT so that self-reference could be correctly represented
it is conventional to represent self-reference incorrectly. MTT uses
adapted FOL to express arbitrary orders of logic. When MTT expressions
are translated into directed graphs a cycle in the graph proves that
the expression is erroneous.
 Here is the Liar Paradox in MTT: LP := ~True(LP)
00 root (1)
01 ~    (2)
02 True (0) // cycle
Same as ~True(~True(~True(~True(...))))
 In Prolog
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
Indicates  ~True(~True(~True(~True(...))))
 In mathematical logic, a sentence (or closed formula)[1] of a predicate
logic is a Boolean-valued well-formed formula with no free variables. A
sentence can be viewed as expressing a proposition, something that must
be true or false.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sentence_(mathematical_logic)
 By definition epistemological antinomies cannot be true or false thus cannot be logic sentences therefore Gödel is wrong.
 

Nope, just shows that you don't understand what Godel is doing.
In fact, you just contradicted your self, as you said your MTT could represent an epistemolgocal antinomy.
Note, Godel's proof shows how to construct a statement from the form of an Epistemological Antinomhy, a "similar" (in form) statement that turns out to have an actual Truth Value.
Please TRY to show where he makes the step that you claim is incorrect.
The SUMMARY statement you reference doesn't do that, and the fact you claim it does shows how stupid you are.