Re: True on the basis of meaning --- Good job Richard ! ---Socratic method

On 5/17/24 9:22 PM, olcott wrote:

On 5/17/2024 8:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 5/17/24 10:32 AM, olcott wrote:

On 5/17/2024 6:41 AM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 5/16/24 11:51 PM, olcott wrote:

On 5/16/2024 10:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 5/16/24 11:20 PM, olcott wrote:

On 5/16/2024 9:54 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 5/16/24 10:44 PM, olcott wrote:

On 5/16/2024 9:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 5/16/24 9:59 AM, olcott wrote:

On 5/16/2024 6:32 AM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 5/16/24 12:44 AM, olcott wrote:

On 5/15/2024 9:33 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 5/15/24 10:17 PM, olcott wrote:

On 5/15/2024 9:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 5/15/24 9:57 PM, olcott wrote:

On 5/13/2024 9:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 5/13/24 10:03 PM, olcott wrote:

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Remember, p defined as ~True(L, p) is BY DEFINITION a truth bearer, as True must return a Truth Value for all inputs, and ~ a truth valus is always the other truth value.
>

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Can a sequence of true preserving operations applied to expressions
that are stipulated to be true derive p?

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On 5/15/2024 8:39 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
 > Which has NOTHING to do with the problem with True(L, p)
 > being true when p is defined in L as ~True(L, p)
>
*YOU ALREADY AGREED THAT True(L, p) IS FALSE*

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No, I said that because there is not path to p, it would need to be false, but that was based on the assumption that it could exist.
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No, so True(L, p) is false
and thus ~True(L, p) is true.
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Can a sequence of true preserving operations applied to expressions
that are stipulated to be true derive ~p?

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On 5/15/2024 7:52 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
 > Which has NOTHING to do with the above,
 > as we never refered to False(L,p).
>
*YOU ALREADY AGREED THAT false(L, p) IS FALSE*

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Right, but that has nothing to do with the problem with True(L, p) being false, because, since p in L is ~True(L, p) so that make True(L, ~false) which is True(L, true) false, which is incorrrect.
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No, so False(L, p) is false,
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Please try and keep these two thoughts together at the same time
*I need to make another point that depends on both of them*
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*YOU ALREADY AGREED THAT True(L, p) IS FALSE*
*YOU ALREADY AGREED THAT false(L, p) IS FALSE*
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right, by your definitions, True(L, p) is False, but that means that True(L, true) is false, so your system is broken.
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You understand that True(English, "a fish") is false
and you understand that False(English, "a fish") is false
and you understand this means that "a fish" is neither True
nor false in English.
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You understand that the actual Liar Paradox is neither true
nor false *THIS IS MUCH MUCH BETTER THAN MOST PEOPLE: Good Job*
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  True(English, "This sentence is not true") is false
False(English, "This sentence is not true") is false
Is saying the same thing that you already know.
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You get stuck when we formalize: "This sentence is not true"
as "p defined as ~True(L, p)", yet the formalized sentence has
the exact same semantics as the English one.
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No, YOU get stuck when you can't figure out how to make True(L, p) with p defined in L as ~True(L, p) work. If it IS false, then the resulting comclusion is that True(L, true) is false, whicn means your system is broken.
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  True(L, true) is false
False(L, true) is false
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This is the Truth Teller Paradox
and is rejected as not a truth bearer.
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No True(L, true) must be TRUE by definiition.

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We could say that "kittens are fifteen story office buildings"
is true by definition and we would be wrong.

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But the fundamental definition of true makes it true.

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*True by definition must actually be true*
*True by definition must actually be true*
*True by definition must actually be true*

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So why did you argue that True(L, true) shouldn't be just true?
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Aren't you just being inconsistant now
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A set of finite string semantic meanings that form an accurate model
of the general knowledge of the actual world are stipulated as true.

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So, do you still think that true, as a value, might not be true?
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Expressions that are {true on the basis of meaning} are ONLY
(a) A set of finite string semantic meanings that form an accurate model
     of the general knowledge of the actual world.
(b) Expressions derived by applying truth preserving operations to (a)
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Years after reading Kripke's article I finally figured out that
the above must be what he mean by grounding. He himself did not
know this at the time.

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In other words, you believe that it is a valid interpretation to change the meaning of words from what the original speaker took the words to mean, and still are able to say that he actually MEANT the sentence with the new meaning of the words.
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Are you still arguing that True(L, true) doesn't need to be true?
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It forms an infinite cycle (in my above algorithm) known as the
Truth Teller Paradox.

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Yes, which shows that True(L, p) can not exist, or it allows the PROVING of both truth values for the Truth Teller Paradox, instead of being able to leave it as a non-truth-bearer.
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Fundamentally, your problem is you don't actually know the meaning of the words you are using, but have assumed (incorrect) meaning from your ZEROTH order study of the field.
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or for any sentance x that has been shown to be true, that
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True(L, x) doesn't need to be true?
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"True(L, true)" lacks a truth object that it is true about.
A sentence cannot correctly be true about being true...
It has to be true about something other than itself.

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true IS the fundamental truth object.
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*No it is not, it is the result of this algorithm*
*No it is not, it is the result of this algorithm*
*No it is not, it is the result of this algorithm*

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No, it is the VALUE of the result of this algorithm, which, BY DEFINITION, is a truth value.
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*The grounding of a truth-bearer to its truthmaker*
True(L,x) returns true when x is derived from a set of truth preserving operations from finite string expressions of language that have been stipulated to have the semantic value of Boolean true. False(L,x) is defined as True(L,~x).   Copyright 2022 PL Olcott

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Which, by your claim makes True(L, p) false, but that makes p to be defined as ~false, which is true, so you are claiming True(L, true) can be false.
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You already agreed that p is neither true nor false.
This means that p is rejected as not a truth-bearer.

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But, by doing so, you make it a truth bearer by the sentecne that defined it.
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There is no way to make a non-truth-bearer into a truth-bearer.

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So, so admit that True(L, p) isn't always at truth-bearer, and thus isn't the required predicate, and thus your claim it is just turns out to be a LIE.
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You try and tell me how you can make "a fish" into an
expression that is true or false.

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Where did I say I could.
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The problem is that p defined in L  as ~True(L, p) is more powerful than your "a fish" statement.
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 It is not at all more powerful. p and ~p continue to lack a sequence
of truth reserving operations from expressions of language stipulated
to be true. This makes p the exact same non-truth-bearer as "a fish".
 

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If necessary we can go over this single point again
and again and again and not talk about anything else
until you get it.
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Try to.
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p is DEFINED to be (in L) the sentence ~True(L, p)
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You already agreed that is neither true nor false.
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If we have to keep going over this sub-point over and over
and not talk about anything else until you get it we will.
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*Your other points below lost track of this simple point*
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*p is neither True nor False*
*p is neither True nor False*
*p is neither True nor False*
*p is neither True nor False*
*p is neither True nor False*
*p is neither True nor False*
*p is neither True nor False*
*p is neither True nor False*
*p is neither True nor False*
*p is neither True nor False*
*p is neither True nor False*
*p is neither True nor False*
*p is neither True nor False*
*p is neither True nor False*
*p is neither True nor False*
*p is neither True nor False*

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Then True(L, p), which form the definition of p, is also not a Truth Bearer, and thus can not be the truth predicate.
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*Once you get this we can move on to the next sub-point*
*When I repeat these things it really seems to help your concentration*
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Oncd you get that a non-truth-bearer resulting operation can't be a predicate, you will understand your error.
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On 5/13/2024 7:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
 > Remember, p defined as ~True(L, p) ...
>
You already admitted that True(L,p) and False(L,p) both return false.
This is the correct value that these predicates correctly derived.

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Right, but that also means that we can show that True(L, true) returns false, which says your logic system is broken by being inconsistant.
>

 Not at all. Your version of the Truth Teller paradox has
the conventional lack of a truth object as the Liar Paradox
and the Truth Teller paradox: What are they true about?

In other words, you logic doesn't have an absolute idea of truth!!!
The object that made the statement true, was that True(L, p) said that p wasn't true.

 This sentence is true.
What is it true about?
It is true about being true.
What is it is true about being true about?
 This turns out to be Kripke ungrounded yet Kripke did
not know the algorithmic basis for Kripke grounding.
 *Outline of a Theory of Truth Saul Kripke* (1975)
https://www.impan.pl/~kz/truthseminar/Kripke_Outline.pdf
 

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It seems that now you are now disagreeing with your own self. You are
saying the predicates are broken BECAUSE THEY RETURN THE CORRECT VALUE.
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No, your logic system disagrees with itself, I am just pointing that out.
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 All that you pointed out is that you still don't understand
the Truth Teller paradox.

No, YOU don't understand that True MUST be a truth beared, or you are just a liar that your system has a Truth Predicate.
Remember, we started with
p in L is ~True(L, p)
you say True(L, p) is false
thus the truth value of p MUST be true, since it is not the falseness of True(L, p)
Thus we can say that p is also the equivalent in L of
~True(L, ~True(L, p))
Which since we showed that True(L, p) was false, that means that the outer True predicate sees a true statement (since it is the negation of a false statement) and thus True(L, ~True(L, p)) is true, and thus we can show that p must be false.
Thus we have a contradiction.
So, if you want to claim "Truth Teller Paradox", the only answer is to say that True(L, p) isn't actually a truth-bearer, and thus it isn't a predicate, and you have lied that your system has one.

 

This is the problem with the assumption that a Truth Predicate exists, and is what Tarksi was pointing out, but which seems to be above your level of understanding.