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On 5/17/24 10:19 PM, olcott wrote:True(L,x) is defined in terms of its truthmaker.On 5/17/2024 8:33 PM, Richard Damon wrote:Nope, because you said the value of "true" doesn't exist, truth is dependent on having something to make true.On 5/17/24 9:22 PM, olcott wrote:>On 5/17/2024 8:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote:>>>>
On 5/13/2024 7:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
> Remember, p defined as ~True(L, p) ...
>
You already admitted that True(L,p) and False(L,p) both return false.
This is the correct value that these predicates correctly derived.
Right, but that also means that we can show that True(L, true) returns false, which says your logic system is broken by being inconsistant.
>
Not at all. Your version of the Truth Teller paradox has
the conventional lack of a truth object as the Liar Paradox
and the Truth Teller paradox: What are they true about?
In other words, you logic doesn't have an absolute idea of truth!!!
>
It does have an immutably correct notion of {true on the basis
of meaning} and rejects finite strings as not truth bearers on
this basis.
*It has nothing that it is true about so it is not true*>Yes, which makes True(L, a sentence proven to be true) to be false.The object that made the statement true, was that True(L, p) said that p wasn't true.>
>
*You agreed that True(L, p) is false and False(L,p) is false*
*You agreed that True(L, p) is false and False(L,p) is false*
*You agreed that True(L, p) is false and False(L,p) is false*
Thus, it is inconsistant.
Or we can use the arguement that sincethen "a fish" because ~True(English, "a fish") is false that
p is ~True(L, p) which is false that p is alse
~True(L, ~True(L, p) which, since True(L, p) is "established" to be false, and thus ~True(L,p) to be true, we can say that True(L, ~True(L, p) must be true*ONE LEVEL OF INDIRECT REFERENCE CHANGES EVERYTHING*
and thus p, being not that is false.We can prove that p is both false and true the exact same way
So, we can prove that p is both false and true, and thus your system is BY DEFINITION inconsistant.
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p is dead!*No you said this* (Socratic question)No, YOU said it first, and I agreed.
What else are you going to make it?
(Socratic reply question)
>RED HERRINBG.thus the truth value of p MUST be true, since it is not the falseness of True(L, p)>
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We test p for True or False if neither it is tossed out on its ass.
>
It is like we are testing if a person is hungry:
We ask is the person dead? The answer is yes and then you
say what if they are still hungry?
>
Since you have claimed that True(L, p) is false, by the stipulated definition of p,Nope I never said that. You agreed that
it MUST be a true statement, and thus you haveThen you contradict yourself when you said
stiplated that True(L, <a statement proven to be true>) turns out to be false (since that statement IS p), and thus you system is*Illegal stipulation. It must come from here*
Yes that one is: "This sentence is not true"Why not?Thus we can say that p is also the equivalent in L of>
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We sure as Hell cannot correctly say that.>In other words, you system doesn't allow the assignement of a statement to have a refenece to itself, which is one of the criteria in Tarski.
*THE ONE LEVEL OF INDIRECT REFERENCE CHANGES EVERYTHING*
*THE ONE LEVEL OF INDIRECT REFERENCE CHANGES EVERYTHING*
*THE ONE LEVEL OF INDIRECT REFERENCE CHANGES EVERYTHING*
>Nope, "This statment is true" is different then the statement:~True(L, ~True(L, p))>
~True(English, ~True(English, "a fish")) is true
~True(English, ~True(English, "This sentence is not true")) is true
~True(English, ~True(English, "This sentence is true")) is true
P, in L, is defined as ~True(L, P)
It it justThe prior one is the ordinary Liar Paradox formalized.
P in L is defined as "P is not true."
The difference is the statement P is not true has the possibility of being a non-truth bearer, but the predicate True(L, p) doesn't have that option.The predicate simple says True(L, p) is false and False(L,p) is false.
"~True(L, p)" is merely a finite string input assigned to the variable named p. We could have as easily have assigned "a fish" to p.>Yep.>>
Which since we showed that True(L, p) was false, that means that the outer True predicate sees a true statement (since it is the negation of a false statement)
~True(English, ~True(English, "a fish")) is true
>Nope, because a fish wasn't defined to be any of those sentencds.and thus True(L, ~True(L, p)) is true, and thus we can show that p must be false.>
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By this same reasoning we can show that "a fish" must be false.
False is defined as True(L,~x) and has no separate existence.>Right, and that it the problem. (we don't need the True(L, ~x) part though.Thus we have a contradiction.>
>
So, if you want to claim "Truth Teller Paradox", the only answer is to say that True(L, p) isn't actually a truth-bearer,
*True(L,x) and True(L,~x) (AKA False) ARE ALWAYS TRUTH-BEARERS*
*True(L,x) and True(L,~x) (AKA False) ARE ALWAYS TRUTH-BEARERS*
*True(L,x) and True(L,~x) (AKA False) ARE ALWAYS TRUTH-BEARERS*
p is defined as ~True(L, p) which you say is false.Let's not change the subject away from the point until
thus, we can also say, by the definiton of p that
p is defined as ~True(L, ~True(L, p))
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