Re: Minimal Logics in the 2020's: A Meteoric Rise --- Olcott lies as he POOPs himself

On 7/8/24 9:35 PM, olcott wrote:

On 7/8/2024 8:24 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 7/8/24 8:56 PM, olcott wrote:

On 7/8/2024 7:37 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 7/8/24 8:28 PM, olcott wrote:

On 7/8/2024 7:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

On 7/8/24 8:00 PM, olcott wrote:

On 7/7/2024 10:09 PM, olcott wrote:

On 7/7/2024 10:02 PM, olcott wrote:

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Formal logic is a subset of this.
Not-a-logic-sentence(PA,g) ≡ (~True(PA,g) ∧ ~True(PA,~g))
There are no truth preserving operations in PA to g or to ~g
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https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
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Within my analytical framework this Tarski sentence is merely
self-contradictory
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(3) x ∉ Provable if and only if x ∈ True. // (1) and (2) combined
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There are no truth preserving operations in Tarski's
theory to x if and only if There are truth preserving
operations in Tarski's theory to x
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There cannot possibly be an infinite proof that proves
that there is no finite proof of Tarski x in Tarski's theory

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Who says there needs to be a infinite proof, since there is no such thing.
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As I said, one example of such an x is Godel's G.
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The infinite proof of the Goldbach conjecture
(if it is true) continues to find more true
cases than it had before, thus makes progress
towards its never ending goal (if its true).

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or, it continue to show that there is no counter examples.
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"Progress" on an infinite path isn't really measurable.
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The cycles in the following two cases never make any progress
towards any goal they are merely stuck in infinite loops.

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Which just means you are on the wrong path. One wrong path doesn't me that there is no path.
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The Prolog unify_with_occurs_check test means that
LP is stuck in an infinite loop that makes no progress
towards resolution. I invented Minimal Type Theory to
see this, then I noticed that Prolog does the same thing.

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Which is irrelevent, since Prolog can't handle the basics of the field that Traski assumes.
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?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
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LP := ~(L ⊢ LP)
00 ~ 01
01 ⊢ 01, 00
02 L
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The cycle in the direct graph of LP is
an infinite loop that make no progress
towards the goal of evaluating LP as
true or false.
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So?
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Failure to prove by example doesn't show something isn't true.
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You are just proving you are stupid and don't know what you are talking about.

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Every expression of language that cannot be proven
or refuted by any finite or infinite sequence of
truth preserving operations connecting it to its
meaning specified as a finite expression of language
is rejected.
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So?
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Tarski's x like Godel's G are know to be true by an infinite sequence of truth preserving operations.
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*You already agreed that such things can never be known*
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The Goldbach conjecture is known to be true or false
yet not which one. Anything known to be true by an infinite
sequence of truth preserving operations contradicts the
fact that nothing can be known to be true by an infinite
sequence of truth preserving operations.
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Yes, if ALL we have is a statement that can only be shown by an infinite series of steps, then we can not know that.
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But many things that take an infinite number of steps in one system, might have a finite proof in another system that can relate back to the original one. KNOWLEDGE can cross system boundaries under the right conditons, even if the proof doesn't transfer.
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Just like Godel's G, that in F, needs an infinite number of tests to prove in F, but by knowing from the meta-F of the implication of that relationship, we can find the "shortcut" to proving it in a finite number of steps.
Goldbach's conjecture might be false, in which case that is provable by just showing the even number that can't be the sum of two primes.
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There might be a finite proof of it, either in the normal mathematics, or in a meta-mathematics that allows us to transfer that knowledge back to ordinary arithmetic.
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Or, it might be that no such proof exists in any meta-mathematics, and if so, it will just be unknown if it is true.
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 Then why do you claiming that we can?
 

I don't, we know it must be true or not, and it might be provable or might be true but unprovable.
There are many possibilities for that conjuecture, and we don't know which one it is.
Unlike Godel's which we know to be True but unprovable.