Re: No true relativist!

On 11/13/2024 10:58 PM, Thomas Heger wrote:

Am Dienstag000012, 12.11.2024 um 18:33 schrieb Ross Finlayson:

On 11/12/2024 12:05 AM, Thomas Heger wrote:

Am Dienstag000012, 12.11.2024 um 06:06 schrieb LaurenceClarkCrossen:

Mr. Hertz: The article, "Poincaré and Cosmic Space: Curved or not?" by
Helge Kragh gives the history of how the elementary error of reifying
space became respected and prestigious thanks to Schwarzschild and
Einstein carrying it over the finish line. Most scientists knew it was
fallacious and it only gained acceptance slowly. From the article it
appears that the key is the idea that non-Euclidean geometry is more
empirical than Euclidean. After all, no one has been able to prove the
fifth postulate that parallel lines never meet. However, no one has
ever
proven that they do. The idea that the universe is spherical given the
vast extent of it now known would make the curvature infinitesimal
so it
is non-falsifiable. This shows that non-Euclidean geometry is not more
empirical.
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Elementary logical analysis remains sufficient to disprove
non-Euclidean
geometry. Obviously spherical geometry and geometry describing other
shapes is valid. It is only the reifying space that is absurd.
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Poincare correctly understood that geometry cannot be reified (in
Einstein's words, "'geometry alone contains no statements about objects
of reality, but only geometry together with physics.'"["Poincaré and
Cosmic Space: Curved or not?" Helge Kragh]

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You understand 'geometry' as 'relations in euclidean space', while
actually higher dimensions have also an embedded geometry.
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Therefore you are right, that Euclidean geometry does not tell anything
about material objects.
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But what about spaces with higher dimensions, from where our observable
universe is an observable subset?
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Since our universe contains matter, the superset of our observable space
must have a connection to matter, too.
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Such a space could be build from the equivalent to a point (but with
more features than than only three spatial dimensions).
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This had to look from any perspective like a valid universe, because our
current position in it is not supposed to be that special.
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So: what construct would fulfill this requirement???
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My view:
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I assume spacetime of GR would exist and was build from 'elements',
which behave 'anti-symmetric'.
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E.g. assume, that each 'point' is actually a bi-quaternion, which are
connected to their neighbors in a multiplicative fashion according to
p' = q * p * q^-1
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Than local time would be a so called 'pseudoscalar' and imaginary to the
so called 'hyperplane of the present' as if that was rotated by a
multiplication with i.
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Then matter could be ragarded as 'timelike stable patterns of/in
spacetime'.
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(a somehow better behaviour seem to have so called 'dual-quaternions').
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...
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TH

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Often "convolutional setting", symmetrical/anti-symmetrical
left-right right-left.
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In something like Geller's Heisenberg group pseudo-differential,
gets involved two symmetrical centers their dynamics.
(Kohn, Stein, Cummins, after Poincare, variously real, "complex",
"real analytic", ..., operators, kernels/cores, pseudo-differential.)
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'anti-symmetric' means, that a multiplication is not commutative, but
changes sign, if the order of multiplicants are exchanged.
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Now this doesn't sound like being that important.
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But in fact it is, because we can see this type of symmetry everywhere.
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E.g. the human body has such characteristics of left and right
'handedness'.
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'Anti-symmetric' also means, you would need two rotations to return an
initial state.
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Now think about two anti-symmetric wheels in contact.
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Then these two wheels would rotate into the same direction.
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This would be really strange in our everyday experience, because it is
opposite to how gears in a gearbox rotate.
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Now assume, that nature is actually build from tiny pointlike elements,
which behave like such strange wheels.
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This could cause 'timelike stable patterns', because such anti-symmetric
points could have features and those features could occur repeatedly and
we may eventually call such structures 'matter'.
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This (apparently strange) idea would allow to explain all sorts of
different experiences of the world around us and is actually very simple.
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But is based on a certain topology of the universe itself, which should
be a smooth continuum, were points can have features.
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Only 'timelike stable patterns' (of such features) within spacetime are
regarded as real entities ('matter'), what makes matter kind of
'ghostlike'.
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This is what makes most physicists dislike such a concept, because it
would eliminate the idea of particles altogether.
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That in turn would allow to create matter out of nowhere (what is
actually observed in 'Grwoing Earth' or 'magic dust')
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And that would violate one of the most sacrosanct principles of physics:
the so called 'grand materialistic meta-paradigme'.
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BUT: nature tells us how nature functions, whether we like it or not.
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We humans have to live with it, whatever nature tells, whether it serves
us or not.
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Therefore the question is not, whether the idea serves us or our
personal life, but whether nature functions this way (or not).
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To ignore reality is a very, very bad idea and could cost much more than
we could eventually gain by ignoring facts.
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TH
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Geller points at Boutet de Monvel, and Kree, in the "real-analytic",
about Szego projections, about the convolutional/pseudo-differential,
when: partials either way simply _won't_ do.
A, sum-of-histories sum-of-potentials with least action and
a vanishing, yet non-zero gradient: is aligned with the
deconstructive, deductive account of a theory including
a physics, and since "what goes up: must come down".
To be an objectivist realist is quite a thorough
ontological commitment, as with regards to what's: true,
a theory where the conserved quantity is, "truth".
And there's nothing else, ....
Good luck T.H., one hopes or "on espere" or "Mann hopf"
that indeed there's a way to get QM and GR back together,
with a sane theory of fall-gravity in the middle, as
today they disagree on the order of 120 orders of magnitude.