Re: Mathematical incompleteness has always been a misconception --- Tarski

On 2/7/2025 4:34 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2025-02-06 14:46:55 +0000, olcott said:
 

On 2/6/2025 2:02 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2025-02-05 16:03:21 +0000, olcott said:
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On 2/5/2025 1:44 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2025-02-04 16:11:08 +0000, olcott said:
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On 2/4/2025 3:22 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2025-02-03 16:54:08 +0000, olcott said:
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On 2/3/2025 9:07 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2025-02-03 03:30:46 +0000, olcott said:
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On 2/2/2025 3:27 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2025-02-01 14:09:54 +0000, olcott said:
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On 2/1/2025 3:19 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2025-01-31 13:57:02 +0000, olcott said:
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On 1/31/2025 3:24 AM, Mikko wrote:

On 2025-01-30 23:10:18 +0000, olcott said:
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Within the entire body of analytical truth any expression of language that has no sequence of formalized semantic deductive inference steps from the formalized semantic foundational truths of this system are simply untrue in this system. (Isomorphic to provable from axioms).

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If there is a misconception then you have misconceived something. It is well
known that it is possible to construct a formal theory where some formulas
are neither provble nor disprovable.

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This is well known.

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And well undeerstood. The claim on the subject line is false.

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a fact or piece of information that shows that something
exists or is true:
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/proof

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We require that terms of art are used with their term-of-art meaning and

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The fundamental base meaning of Truth[0] itself remains the same
no matter what idiomatic meanings say.

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Irrelevant as the subject line does not mention truth.
Therefore, no need to revise my initial comment.

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The notion of truth is entailed by the subject line:
misconception means ~True.

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The title line means that something is misunderstood but that something
is not the meaning of "true".

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It is untrue because it is misunderstood.

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Mathematical incompleteness is not a claim so it cannot be untrue.

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That mathematical incompleteness coherently exists <is> claim.

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Yes, but you didn't claim that.
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The closest that it can possibly be interpreted as true would
be that because key elements of proof[0] have been specified
as not existing in proof[math] math is intentionally made less
than complete.

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Math is not intentionally incomplete.

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You paraphrased what I said incorrectly.

 No, I did not paraphrase anything.
 

Proof[math] was defined to have less capability than Proof[0].

 That is not a part of the definition but it is a consequence of the
definition. Much of the lost capability is about things that are
outside of the scope of mathemiatics and formal theories.
 

When one thinks of math as only pertaining to numbers then math
is inherently very limited. When one applies something like
Montague Grammar to formalize every detail of natural language
semantics then math takes on much more scope.
When we see this then we see "incompleteness" is a mere artificial
contrivance. True(x) always means that a connection to a semantic
truthmaker exists. When math does this differently it is simply
breaking the rules.

Many theories are incomplete,
intertionally or otherwise, but they don't restrict the rest of math.
But there are areas of matheimatics that are not yet studied.
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When-so-ever any expression of formal or natural language X lacks
a connection to its truthmaker X remains untrue.

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An expresion can be true in one interpretation and false in another.

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I am integrating the semantics into the evaluation as its full context.

 Then you cannot have all the advantages of formal logic. In particular,
you need to be able to apply and verify formally invalid inferences.
 

All of the rules of correct reasoning (correcting the errors of
formal logic) are merely semantic connections between finite strings:
When one finite string expression of language is known to be true
other expressions are know to be semantically entailed.

When we do this and require an expression of formal or natural language
to have a semantic connection to its truthmaker then true[0] cannot
exist apart from provable[0].

 Maybe, maybe not. Without the full support of formal logic it is hard to
prove. An unjustified faith does not help.
 

It all has always boiled down to semantic entailment.

True[math] can only exist apart from Provable[math] within
the narrow minded, idiomatic use of these terms. This is
NOT the way that True[0] and Provable[0] actually work.

 If you want that to be true you need to define True[math] differently
from the way "truth" is used by mathimaticians.
 

We could equally define a "dead cat" to be a kind of {cow}.
Math does not get to change the way that truth really works,
when math tries to do this math is incorrect.

My point is much more clear when we see that Tarski attempts
to show that True[0] is undefinable.
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf

 Tarski did not attempt to show that True[0] is undefinable. He showed
quite successfully that arthmetic truth is undefinable. Whether that
proof applies to your True[0] is not yet determined.
 

Tarski is the foremost author of the whole notion of every
kind of truth. "snow is white" because within the actual state
of affairs the color of snow is perceived by humans to be white.
--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer