Re: There is no logic here (Was: Quine's "Word & Object")

On 03/23/2025 06:49 AM, Julio Di Egidio wrote:

On 23/03/2025 03:46, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>

If you start taking a look at Word & Object, Quine is
plenty voluble about modern logics' efforts, and problems.
>
Which he phrases in nice sorts of ways as sort of allusion
to criticism then though sometimes the waffling.
>
Strawson though stands out as sort of uncontradicted,
especially when Quine's "relevance" is sort of the
opposite of what's usually meant, for relevance logic.
>
Yet, then Strawson also himself wrote himself into
the corner of modern logic, though at least he's less

>
Says who?  Rather one is a logicist and the lying with numbers,
the other is a logician proper: guess who's who.
>
Just take "Sinn und Bedeutung": how to build a whole edifice
on the basis on the systematic misplacement and misuse of even
the most basic philosophical (in the broad sense) notions.
Which is but one little example out of the whole edifice of
our inculture and incivilization: insanity, alienation, abuse,
and the systematic lying.
>
Indeed, Strawson isn't less misrepresented then ignored than
Socrates vs Plato/Aristotle, or Leibniz vs Kant/Newton, or the
first Wittgenstein vs Frege/Russell...
>
Rather, read Strawson's "Introduction to Logical Theory" if you
want to know what (modern) Logic actually is: or, would/could/
should/used to be.  Or, is.
>
-Julio
>

Well first one should also consider Hegel's "Wissenschaft der Logik",
then besides having read Aristotle, and not just a half-account.
It's idealism, Julio, and platonism, that a modern "true"
logic needs to have reincorporated to arrive at more than
a fickle, inconstant, temerous, not-a-theory.
It's a theory, that's considered the desiderata and requirements,
of reason, for rationality or de res de re de natura de verum.
If modern logicist positivism is simply to make a detachment
from otherwise false teleology, then the great resulting ontology
can only attain to be a true teleology, otherwise that it is dust,
a lich of dust.
Sort of like W.H.F. Barnes or R.G. Collingwood, yet really for
both Kant and Hegel, who both had both a strong analytical
and thoroughly idealistic course, has that Quine's wrestling
with concepts of logical paradox, never sees him quite win,
which can only result from resolving them.
Thanks for your reply, and please explain how there can be
a true theory overall at all, vis-a-vis some ideal Comenius
language and our mere human inter-subjective Coleridge language,
that there is one at all results from plain reason.