Re: Why does the universe go to all the bother of existing?

On 04/11/2025 08:17 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

On 04/11/2025 06:44 AM, J. J. Lodder wrote:

Physfitfreak <physfitfreak@gmail.com> wrote:
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On 4/10/25 3:32 PM, J. J. Lodder wrote:

Physfitfreak <physfitfreak@gmail.com> wrote:
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On 4/10/25 2:20 AM, J. J. Lodder wrote:

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The Universe is not an evolved biologcal system.
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Jan

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How do you know that? How can one state that as fact without having
the
means to check it?

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Ockham told me.
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Jan
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Hmm.. Ockham didn't tell you Einstein wrote that letter of
recommendation himself?

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That is not the simplest explanation.
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Jan
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The simplest explanation is none, yet, then that's
no explanation. How does explanation not exist?
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Why does the universe go to all the bother of explaining?
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There's quite a significant amount of data to explain.
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"Parsimony" may simply be taking the inner product,
then as with regards to the uniqueness of the result,
is a matter of wider concerns.
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So, parsimony can readily arrive at that parsimony
is merely slant on the bias, or, parsimony by definition
is merely partial.
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Nature's frugality of a sort or for least-action or
for Maupertuis and other definitions what makes least-action,
for example whether it's any old gradient the partial derivative,
"simple", or the sum-of-histories sum-of-potentials with least-action
the least-gradient of the cosmic clockworks, that being,
"simple", or instead you can just explain that you can
ask your phone for delivery since an apple fell on Newton's head
("stupid").
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Of course that's a contrived example that most would
say would be too simple to the point of being ignorant
and in terms of the wider milieu, incompetent.
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Yeah the simplest, ..., is, none.
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Then with regards to theories of evolution applying to
anything, and everything, then gets introduced, for example,
the data of all the theory about it there ever was.
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So, "why are we here" can have "Ockham doesn't say".
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The "nominalism" makes it easy to pick up and put down
theories without much of an ontological commitment to
an ontological status, yet that's not much of an ontological
commitment to an ontological status.
When it's eliminated that over-simplistic theories
can explain theory like physics, then it must be
not an over-simple theory.
When anyone can arrive at scientific principles,
they sort of make sense.
These days there is a more of a resurgence of
"realism", not nominalism, besides "platonism",
not nominalism, and realist platonists can have
theories of science just fine.
That's not much promoting prevarication and equivocation,
univocation in a sense.