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On 2026-04-20, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:F ⊢ GF ↔ ¬ProvF(⌜GF⌝)Proof-theoretic semantics is inherently inferential, asTwenty years ago (under my sixth-grade-adopted nickname "Mike"),
it is inferential activity which manifests itself in proofs.
...inferences and the rules of inference establish the
meaning of expressions.
Schroeder-Heister, Peter, 2024 "Proof-Theoretic Semantics"
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic-semantics/
#InfeIntuAntiReal
>
Provable(PA, φ) := ∃Γ ⊂ PA(Γ ⊣ φ)
There exists a finite set Γ of inference steps of PA such that φ
is back-chained to PA can ALWAYS be resolved in directly in SOL.
Has_Meaning_PTS(PA, φ) := Provable(PA, φ)
I posted in sci.math that Gödel's G was meaningless due to the
infinite regression toward infinity on the basis of which its
meaning was supposedly obtained.
The correct interpretation was, I argued, not "This sentence is
unprovable," but rather:
The following is unprovable (1):
The following is unprovable (2):
The following is unprovable (3):
...
As regards semantics, I could call statement (1) the "unencoded
sentence," sentence (2) the "first encoded sentence," the concept
under which all sentences (1)-(∞) belong the "formally abstracted
sentence," and the concept under which all sentences (2)-(∞)
belong the "encoding-abstracted sentence."
Then, I could argue that:
1. The /unencoded sentence/ is /true and meaningful/. It's a
statement about numbers.
2. The /formally abstracted/ and /encoding-abstracted/ sentences
are both /meaningless/.
Does this seem in agreement with your view? If so, how would you
describe my concepts in your own terms?
--Scott Hoge
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